Environmental Law Is Being Used to Block Environmental Uses of Coastal Land: CEQA’s Perverse Effects on Surf Culture Infrastructure

Environmental Law Is Being Used to Block Environmental Uses of Coastal Land: CEQA’s Perverse Effects on Surf Culture Infrastructure

The California Environmental Quality Act, Designed to Protect the Environment, Is Being Deployed Against Surf Camps, Coastal Retreats, and Low-Impact Recreational Development

Bohiney.com | The London Prat

BIG SUR / SANTA CRUZ, Calif. – The California Environmental Quality Act, enacted in 1970 as one of the foundational environmental protection statutes of the modern environmental movement, requires environmental review for virtually any project in California that might have a significant effect on the environment. The intent was to ensure that development projects considered their environmental consequences before proceeding. The effect, in the decades since, has been to create a legal tool of such breadth and flexibility that it can be used by any party – including those with no genuine environmental interest – to delay, complicate, or block development projects they oppose for reasons having nothing to do with the environment. Surf camps, coastal retreat centers, and low-impact recreational facilities along the California coast have discovered CEQA as a barrier that can be mobilized by neighbors, competitors, and local officials against projects that would, on any reasonable environmental assessment, have minimal impact on the coastal environment they are accused of threatening.

The surf camp development case illustrates CEQA’s perverse effects with clarity. A proposed small-scale surf camp on coastal land – a modest collection of cabins or structures serving surfers who would otherwise stay in hotels or drive up daily from urban areas – typically has lower environmental impact than the alternatives: fewer vehicle trips, concentration of activity in one area rather than dispersal across the coastline, and a client base specifically committed to the ocean environment. Yet CEQA reviews can be triggered by opposition from neighbors who prefer no development, from local governments reluctant to permit uses that attract users from outside the community, and from competing operators who benefit from limiting competition. The review process itself, regardless of its outcome, adds years and hundreds of thousands of dollars to project development costs that smaller operators and community-based organizations cannot absorb.

The Economics of CEQA Abuse

The Independent Institute has documented extensively how CEQA functions as a tool of incumbent protection in California’s land use economy. The largest and most sophisticated developers – those with the legal departments, the cash reserves, and the political relationships to navigate years of environmental review – can absorb CEQA’s costs as a cost of doing business and price them into their projects. Small operators, community organizations, and individual entrepreneurs cannot, which means CEQA systematically advantages large capital over small capital in California’s land use market while presenting itself as an environmental protection mechanism. The surf economy, which is disproportionately composed of small operators, individual shapers, and community-based organizations, is particularly exposed to this dynamic.

The reforms necessary to restore CEQA’s environmental protection function without its incumbent-protection side effects include time limits on the environmental review process, standing limitations that restrict challenges to parties with genuine environmental rather than purely competitive interests, and expedited review pathways for projects that demonstrably improve upon their environmental alternatives. These reforms have been discussed in California policy circles for decades and resisted by the combination of environmental advocacy organizations that correctly identify CEQA as important to genuine environmental protection and real estate interests that have learned to use CEQA strategically against their competitors. The surf community’s interest is in the former without the latter, which requires the kind of specific legislative engagement that the community has historically not prioritized. The ocean deserves better environmental protection than CEQA currently provides when it functions as a competitive weapon rather than an environmental tool.

The CEQA reform debate has been ongoing in California for decades, and the political coalition that would produce meaningful reform faces the structural challenge that CEQA’s most enthusiastic defenders are the environmental advocacy organizations whose objectives the surf community largely shares, while CEQA’s most enthusiastic reformers are the real estate development interests whose environmental record the surf community is rightly skeptical of. Threading this needle requires the surf community to articulate a CEQA reform position that distinguishes between the environmental protection functions worth preserving and the competitive protection functions worth eliminating, and to build political relationships with the legislators who can pass that distinction into law. This is harder than either defending CEQA entirely or attacking it entirely. It is the political work that the actual complexity of the issue requires, and the surf community’s credibility as an environmental stakeholder gives it standing to do it that most libertarian critics of CEQA lack.

The shark management issue also connects to the broader question of how risk is distributed in recreational ocean use. The government that regulates ocean access has allocated the risk of shark encounter to the surfer – you enter the ocean knowing the protected predator may be present, and the legal framework reflects the collective decision that shark conservation outweighs the risk reduction that alternative management could provide. This allocation of risk is a legitimate collective choice, but it is one that deserves honest acknowledgment and honest engagement with the surfers who bear the risk. A government that allocates risk to a specific population while charging that population for parking should at minimum be transparent about the trade-offs it has made on their behalf.

For more analysis of freedom and markets visit Independent Institute. SOURCE: https://bohiney.com/